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INTRODUCTION
Media coverage of prisoner abuse describes disturbing U.S.
military prison conditions, the International Red Cross has expressed
concern of "significant problems" with U.S. confinement techniques,
and U.S. prison policies have faced mounting legal challenges.'
* J.D., AFP International Scholar, Belarus State Economic University, Faculty of
Law.
1. See generally Torture in U.S. Prisons in Iraq, Guantanamo, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 4, 2004, at 24A; Guantanamo Bay: Tantamount to Torture,
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These critiques are indicative of a U.S. detention system far below
the basic minimum standards for treatment of prisoners under
international law. Accounts of long-term solitary confinement and
other torture techniques demonstrate that current detention methods
are not indications of U.S. leadership in human rights. Use of
extreme conditions and degrading treatment for political prisoners or
enemy combatants should come as no surprise, however, given the
United States' increasingly harsh treatment of its civilian prison
population in maximum security prisons ("supermax facilities")
nationwide.3 The near pervasive practice of extended solitary
confinement as a commonplace and legally legitimate detention
method demonstrates extreme disregard for incarcerated U.S.
citizens and is a tangible basis upon which torture for foreign
nationals seems somehow more feasible.4
This essay will first discuss the history of solitary confinement as
a prison technique and its negative psychological consequences.
Parts II-IV then recount the international standards for prison
conditions and, comparatively, the protection afforded under the
Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Part V will then discuss
progressive European prison standards and protection of
international human rights. This essay concludes, in Part VI, that
GUARDIAN, Dec. 1, 2004, at 25; Carol D. Leonnig, Further Detainee Abuse
Alleged; Guantanamo Prison Cited in FBI Memos, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2004, at
Al.
2. See Nan D. Miller, International Protection of the Rights of Prisoners: Is
Solitary Confinement in the United States a Violation of International Standards?,
26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 139, 169 (1995); Christine Rebman, The Eighth Amendment
and Solitary Confinement: The Gap in Protection from Psychological
Consequences, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 567, 617 (1999).
3. Alan Eisner, Supermax Prisons: A Growing Human Rights Issue,
CHAMPION, Aug. 2004, at 36 (reviewing a U.S. Department of Justice report noting
how at least thirty states operated supermax facilities, keeping inmates in constant
solitary confinement with minimal interaction).
4. Charles A. Pettigrew, Comment, Technology and the Eighth Amendment:
The Problem of Supermax Prisons, 4 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 191, 191-92 (2002). At
the end of 2000, 6.5 million people were either in prison, jail, on probation or on
parole, accounting for 3.5% of the U.S. population. Id. at 191 (citing a Bureau of
Justice statistics report and Claire Schaeffer-Duffy, Long Term Lockdowns:
Psychological Effects of Solitary Confinement and Stun Devices, NAT'L CATHOLIC
REP., Dec. 8, 2000). The number of supermax prisoners in 2000 was estimated to
be between 25,000 and 100,000. Id. at 191-92.
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U.S. solitary confinement practices contravene international treaty
law, violate established international norms, and do not represent
sound foreign policy.
I. SOLITARY CONFINEMENT-NEW USE OF AN
OLD TECHNIQUE
Solitary confinement as a technique for prison management and
rehabilitation has been utilized in the United States since the creation
of U.S. penitentiaries nearly two hundred years ago.' The Quakers
created the first American penitentiaries as a means of encouraging
self-reflection and repentance for criminals.6 Initially constructing
individual rooms for solitary introspection, penitence and reform, the
Quakers largely abandoned the concept after observing detrimental
psychological effects generated by prolonged solitude.7 In 1826,
Beaumont and Alexis de Tocqueville denounced a New York prison
experiment using continuous solitary confinement for all inmates:
"This experiment, of which the favorable results had been
anticipated, proved fatal for the majority of prisoners. It devours the
victims incessantly and unmercifully; it does not reform, it kills."8
Nonetheless, solitary confinement persisted as a practice of
punishment in U.S. prisons. 9
Today, solitary confinement is typically referred to as
"segregation."1 Segregation comes in a variety of forms: as standard
5. See JOSEPH T. HALLINAN, GOING UP THE RIVER: TRAVELS IN A PRISON
NATION Xvi (2003).
6. See id.I see also Miller, supra note 2, at 155, 160 (discussing the "Auburn
Prison System," which was disbanded in 1820 after prisoners in long-term solitary
confinement displayed negative psychological repercussions).
7. See Miller, supra note 2, at 155.
8. Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A
Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 477, 483 (1977) (quoting TORSTEN ERIKSSON, THE REFORMERS,
AN HISTORICAL SURVEY OF PIONEER EXPERIMENTS IN THE TREATMENT OF
CRIMINALS 49 (1976)).
9. Id.
10. See id. at 497 (noting how the terms can be used interchangeably for the
purpose of referring to their punitive effect on the prisoner). Segregation, however,
may involve instances where a prisoner is not completely cut off from the entire
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
operating procedure, as a protective measure arising from situational
prison incidents, for punishment, and even to ensure mental
stability." Segregation units encompass a specific prison area,
known in the most up-to-date maximum-security facilities as secure
housing units ("SHUs").
The first supermax facility was created in Marion, Illinois in 1963,
and most supermax prisons replicate the structure of the "Marion
Model. ' 12 Because Marion was built with "a blueprint for coercive
behavior modification achieved through severe isolation techniques"
in mind, most supermax prisons have similar characteristics. 3 For
example, once a prisoner is selected for segregation for whatever
reason, they are confined to a cell for approximately twenty-two
hours a day.' 4 There is no human contact when such prisoners are
given meals, which are eaten in their cells, or if they are allowed to
exercise, which occurs in solitary cages.' 5 Although the general
prison population has access to educational vocational training, SHU
prisoners usually are not able to participate in any of these
rehabilitative techniques. 16 Craig Haney, a psychologist widely
recognized for his studies of the psychological effects of solitary
confinement, recounts the theory: "Solitary confinement has been
around for a long time .... What's different about these supermax
units is that the technology of the modem correctional institution
allows for a separation, almost a technological separation, of inmates
prison population, but rather the prisoner is segregated with other prisoners. Id.
The end effect is that "these prisoners are simultaneously and paradoxically
isolated and overcrowded." Id.
11. Id. at 493-94, 496-97, 507.
12. See id. at 495 (explaining that the repeated replication of such facilities is,
in part, a response to academic literature minimizing the psychological impact of
such confinement conditions and practices).
13. See Miller, supra note 2, at 157; see also JAMIE FELLNER & JOANNE
MARINER, HUM. RTS. WATCH, COLD STORAGE: SUPERMAXIMUM SECURITY
CONFINEMENT IN INDIANA (1997), available at http//:hrw.org/reports/1997/usind/
(adding that such confinement techniques are also derivative of a changing
political climate and used as a management tool).
14. See Miller, supra note 2, at 159.
15. Id. (noting that before inmates are permitted to go to the "exercise pen," the
prisoner is subject to an inspection while standing nude in front of the prison cell).
16. Id.
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from the social world around them in ways that [really were not]
possible in the past." 7
Of course the initial question to consider is why, after determining
over a century ago that prolonged isolation has detrimental and even
counterproductive effects on prisoners, would institutions in the last
forty years reinstitute the practice? Likely, it is a culmination of
factors, and prison administrators often proffer justifications from an
increasingly violent inmate profile to insufficient funding for proper
security. 8 A primary problem is legislative actions, such as sentence
length, mandatory sentencing, and stricter sentencing guidelines for
minor offenses, which contribute to overcrowded institutions. 9 With
increased numbers come increased security risks and the need to
"manage" individuals. Under current prison practices, virtually all
inmates from death row or the general prison population will spend
time in segregation.20 Joseph T. Hallinan, a Wall Street Journal
columnist, has traveled extensively throughout the nation's supermax
facilities and describes the Texas system of segregation:
Theoretically, [administrative segregation] is not intended as
punishment. Texas inmates are placed in here not because
they have done something wrong, but "for the purposes of
maintaining safety, security, and order" in the prison ....
There are three levels of [administrative segregation] in
Texas, and most newcomers spend at least ninety days in
level 3, the most restrictive. Level 3 inmates receive no
deodorant, no shampoo, and no toothpaste--only a small box
of baking soda to use to brush their teeth. The other items are
17. Pettigrew, supra note 4, at 194-95 (quoting J.E. Relly, Inside, No One Can
Hear You Scream, TucSON WKLY., May 3, 1999).
18. See HALLINAN, supra note 5, at xv-xvi (noting how cost concerns have
drastically changed prison designs from the early nineteenth century to today).
19. See Craig Haney, Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain: Confronting
the Coming Crisis in Eighth Amendment Law, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 499,
523-25, 542-48 (1997) (explaining the origins of the "just deserts" theory of
incarceration, where retribution by the government trumps notions of
rehabilitation, and providing an overview of the negative psychological effects of
overcrowding on prisoners, including impeded cognitive development).
20. See HALLINAN, supra note 5, at 5-7.
AM. U. INT'L L.RE v.
considered perks to be handed out as rewards for good
behavior.2'
Unfortunately, because the Supreme Court has found no
affirmative right to rehabilitation, the fears of prison administrators,
while not completely unfounded, manifest into an extraordinary
emphasis on repressive control. 22 Some posit that this is a near-
obsessive level of control, manifested in the implementation of
regular segregation, surveillance devices, "widespread and
unprecedented deployment of lethal weapons, and the installation of
highly sophisticated and expensive security hardware and
technology. '23 There were periods during the 1980s where the use of
prolonged segregation was so pervasive in California prisons-San
Quentin and Folsom, for example-that fifty percent or more of all
the inmates were in long-term lockup.24 Although one psychiatrist
working in such California SHUs at the time described them as
producing "an atmosphere of terror rarely seen elsewhere" in society,
it is increasingly common for prisoners to be confined in SHUs for
years.
II. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT
Prisoners subjected to extensive segregation in SHUs have
additional difficulties severe enough to cause near permanent mental
21. Id. at 5.
22. See Hum. Rts. Watch, World Report 1994, United States [Report
Overview], http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94/Back.htm (last visited Oct. 27,
2005) (contrasting U.S. rejection of an affirmative rehabilitation right with
international principles requiring more proactive protection of human dignity).
23. Haney, supra note 19, at 548-49 (reviewing various types of devices used
to ensure control, including metal detectors, x-ray machines and tasers).
24. Id. at 549.
25. Id.; see also Robert .M. Ferrier, Note, "An Atypical and Significant
Hardship ": The Supermax Confinement of Death Row Prisoners Based Purely on
Status-A Plea for Procedural Due Process, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 293 (2004)
(analyzing the psychological effects of supermax confinement on death-row
inmates).
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and emotional damage.26  The lack of social contact and
environmental stimulation often results in extreme psychological
problems, such as extraordinary malaise and increased violent
tendencies.27 Dr. Stuart Grassian was one of the first American
psychiatrists to conduct an extensive study on such effects.28 In 1983,
pursuant to a court order mandating psychiatric evaluation of fifteen
inmates at Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole, Dr.
Grassian observed and interviewed inmates in segregation. 29 He
determined that prisoners subjected to extensive periods of
segregation demonstrated a medical condition that is termed Reduced
Environmental Stimulation ("RES").30 Dr. Grassian found that the
the main consequential symptoms of RES were "perpetual
distortions, hallucinations, hyperresponsivity to external stimuli,
aggressive fantasies, overt paranoia, inability to concentrate, and
problems with impulse control."3 1 Dr. Grassian concluded that rigidly
26. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 8, at 534 (noting that the risk of permanent
damage is greater for inmates with preexisting psychological impairments).
27. Holly Boyer, Comment, Home Sweet Hell: An Analysis of the Eighth
Amendment's 'Cruel and Unusual Punishment' Clause as Applied to Supermax
Prisons, 32 Sw. U. L. REv. 317, 327 (2003).
28. See id. (noting that Dr. Grassian commonly testifies in lawsuits brought by
prisoners concerning prison conditions). Dr. Gassian had established an impressive
academic and professional record by the mid-1990s to back up the veracity of his
findings, including being a professor at Harvard medical school, maintaining a
private practice as a board certified psychiatrist, and serving in a supervisory
capacity to a number of organizations. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1159
n.12 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
29. Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1450 (1983).
30. See Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1230-32 (noting how RES symptoms also
appear in, inter alia, hostages and prisoners of war); see also Boyer, supra note 23,
at 327. For the purposes of this essay, the term RES is limited to characterizing the
deleterious symptoms of solitary confinement as reported in Grassian's study. Cf
Haney & Lynch, supra note 7, at 519 n.210 (recounting potentially beneficial uses
of RES, such as quitting smoking and helping to cure alcoholism, through the use
of placement in a flotation tank and other similar techniques).
31. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1230; see also Boyer, supra note 27, at 327. The
effects of these symptoms are in many cases quite dire. Recounting the words of a
prisoner taking part in the Walpole study: "I cut my wrists-cut myself many
times when in isolation. Now it seems crazy. But every time I did it, I wasn't
thinking-lost control--cut myself without knowing what I was doing." Grassian,
supra note 29, at 1453.
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
imposed solitary confinement strongly suggests substantial
psychopathological effects.32
Although RES had not been previously reported or clinically
identified in medical literature, the observations conducted were
extremely similar to earlier German studies.33 Between 1854 and
1909, thirty-seven articles published in German journals collectively
delineated hundreds of cases of psychoses linked to conditions of
imprisonment.34 Similar to Dr. Grassian's study, the German studies
described hallucinatory, paranoid, and confusional psychosis
characterized by vivid hallucinations, dissociative tendencies,
agitation, aimless violence, and delusions. Although many of the
studies failed to specify the exact conditions of imprisonment, in
more than half the literature solitary confinement techniques were
specifically cited as responsible for precipitating the psychosis.35
In the last decade, as incidences of long-term segregation
increased, psychological studies of Pelican Bay's SHUs indicate
extraordinarily high rates of psychological trauma among prisoners,
including anxiety, nervousness, ruminations, irrational anger, social
withdrawal, violent fantasies, hallucinations, and suicidal ideation.36
Examinations of administrative segregation units in Texas prisons
revealed inmates "who had smeared themselves with feces. In other
instances, there were people who had urinated in their cells, and the
urination was on the floor. ' 37 Still others in the same unit could be
seen babbling and shrieking, banging their hands on the wall, and
one prisoner scrubbed his body to remove imaginary bugs. 8
It is evident, therefore, that the psychological effects of prison
isolation have been recognized for at least the last century and
certainly in American medical journals for the past twenty years.
But, if the purpose of prisons is rehabilitative, as well as punitive and
32. See Grassian, supra note 29, at 1454.
33. Id. at 1453.
34. Id. at 1450-51.
35. Id. at 1451.
36. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 8, at 524 (explaining how such symptoms
were present in over eighty percent of the inmates evaluated).
37. Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 909 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
38. See id. at 909, 912; see also HALLINAN, supra note 5, at 6.
[21:71
2005] SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 79
restitutive, how can segregation be harmonized with ultimate
criminal justice goals? According to prison administrators, the use of
segregation techniques is a security measure necessary to protect
both staff and prisoners from the assault and predatory tendencies of
inmates.3 9 It is notable, however, that especially for women prisoners
who undergo similar, if not identical, forms of segregation in SHUs,
that the percentage of violence against other inmates and prison staff
is small.4 ° In addition, records from the infamous California
Department of Corrections show that some inmates assigned to
SHUs at Pelican Bay Prison have had their segregation times
extended for relatively minor offenses.41 Moreover, psychological
studies of inmates in long-term segregation suggest the degree of
social contact lost can seriously affect coping skills, thus creating
further alienation and social withdrawal.42 While prison officials
posit that inmates in segregation are only there as long as it takes
them to turn their behavior around, the psychological effects of this
punishment make it difficult, perhaps impossible, to distinguish
between behavior resulting from prolonged isolation and that which
will perpetually pose a threat to prison security.4 3
1II. U.S. PRISONERS' RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
A number of international treaties and declarations establish the
scope of prisoner rights. Signatories to such documents are expected
39. AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RIGHTS FOR ALL: "NOT
PART OF MY SENTENCE": VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN
CUSTODY 95 (AI Index No. 51/01/99, 1999), available at http://web.amnesty.org/
library/Index/engAMR510011999.
40. See generally id.
41. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1240-41, 1244, 1280 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (adjudicating a lawsuit over prison conditions and treatment of prisoners at
Pelican Bay Prison in California); see also infra notes 110-14 and accompanying
text (discussing Madrid).
42. See Rebman, supra note 2, at 582 (recounting the words of Dr. Haney, who
noted that "many prisoners become entirely dependent upon the structure and
routines of the institution for the control of their behavior," resulting in further
social and behavioral difficulties).
43. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 8, at 490-91; Rebman, supra note 2, at
572-75.
AM. U. INT'L L. RE V.
to not only respect the established rules of law created therein, but
also to encourage systems of dignity and respect for human life." In
essence, by signing international treaties, especially those of a self-
executing nature,45 governments explicitly agree to regulation of their
actions and balancing of government interests with that of individual
liberties.46 Currently, the United States is a signatory to numerous
treaties, which incorporate international human rights standards that
originated from non-binding legal principles; these non-binding
principles provided legitimacy in form rather than substance.47
Following the end of World War II, creation of an international
regulatory organization was thought essential to ensure continued
peace, economic growth, and democracy. The degree of protection
afforded to prisoners has increased significantly since the creation of
the United Nations Charter ("U.N. Charter") in 1945. 48 The U.N.
Charter represented an initial recognition of individual rights that
served to legitimize the United Nations as not only a guarantor of
government oversight, but also as an innovative international
coordinator of democratic ideals.4 9 Though there is no specific
language addressing the rights of prisoners, Article 55 of the U.N.
Charter, by promoting "universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion," makes clear a general standard of
rights applicable to all individuals.5 0 Shortly thereafter, in 1948, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Universal Declaration")
44. Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva
Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 97, 109-10 (2004).
45. See generally id. at 125-26 (debating whether the Geneva Conventions, in
whole or in part, are self-executing).
46. See U.S. CONST. art. VI; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Law of Treaties].
47. See Miller, supra note 2, at 141.
48. U.N. Charter.
49. See id. pmbl. (setting forth as its goals, inter alia, the reaffirmation of "faith
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, [and]
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small").
50. Id. art. 55(c).
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further illuminated the importance of recognizing human rights. 51
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration specifically states that "[n]o
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment." 2 Although neither of these initial human
rights documents were legally binding, they were generally accepted
as part of customary international law.53 In terms of prisoners' rights
specifically, the Universal Declaration served to bring international
attention to issues of torture and punishment, upon which further
developments on protecting individuals could be established. 4
Prisoner protection itself, however, was largely formulated in the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, most notably in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War ("Geneva
III"). 55 Geneva III was the first legal instrument to acknowledge and
implement protections for prisoners of war.56 It not only delineated
that prisoners of war were to be treated humanely at all times, but
also provided basic definitions and principles for future international
prisoner standards. 57 The rationale behind basing modem civil
prisoner standards on documents specifically defining the rights of
prisoners of war is that no government should legitimately treat
51. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration].
52. Id. art. 5.
53. See Miller, supra note 2, at 141; see also Suzanne M. Bernard, An Eye for
an Eye: The Current Status of International Law on the Humane Treatment of
Prisoners, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 759, 769 (1994) (noting how the Universal
Declaration carries "great weight and may be taken as evidence of binding
customary international law").
54. See Bernard, supra note 53, at 769.
55. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; see also Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
56. See generally Jinks & Sloss, supra note 44, at 108-12 (analyzing the
foundation of Geneva III and the other three Geneva Conventions).
57. Geneva III, supra note 55, art. 13; Miller, supra note 2, at 142.
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
prisoners captured during unrest and conflict better than civil
prisoners. 8
The United States, as a member of the Organization of American
States ("OAS"), has also agreed to specific prisoner rights in a more
regional context. The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man ("American Declaration"), established shortly before the
Universal Declaration, provided two articles dealing specifically with
prisoner rights.5 9 Article XXV of the American Declaration vowed
that "every individual who has been deprived of his liberty ... has
the right to humane treatment during the time he is in custody. 60
Article XXVI further determined that every prisoner has the right "to
be free from cruel, infamous, or unusual punishment."' 61 Thirty years
later in the American Convention on Human Rights ("American
Convention"), the OAS identified what might be considered outside
the realm of acceptable government conduct.62 Article 5 of the
American Convention states that "[e]very person has the right to
have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected. '63 Further,
Article 5 reiterates the prohibition of "torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment or treatment," and encourages inmate
reformation by stating: "Punishments consisting of deprivation of
liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform and social
readaptation of the prisoners."'  Perhaps these statements are not
coextensive, but it is likely that some textual relation exists given the
58. Miller, supra note 2, at 142 (arguing that treating prisoners captured
"amidst the chaos of armed conflict" better than civil prisoners would be
"absurd").
59. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Official
Rec., OEA/Ser. L./V.II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser. L. V./II.82,
doc. 6 rev. 1, at 17 (1992), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/
basic2.htm.
60. Id. art. XXV.
61. Id. art. XXVI.
62. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 74(2),
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-
32.htm.
63. Id. art. 5.
64. Id.
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specific description of mental and physical integrity in the same
context as cruel and degrading punishment.
In terms of specific international rules setting forth how prisons
should operate globally, the U.N. in 1955 adopted the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners ("Standard Rules").65
The Standard Rules recognize solitary confinement and prolonged
segregation as appropriate only in exceptional circumstances, to be
used sparingly.66 Analogizing to European standards, "Imprisonment
is by the deprivation of liberty a punishment in itself. The conditions
of imprisonment and the prison regimes shall not, therefore, except
as incidental to justifiable segregation, or the maintenance of
discipline, aggravate the suffering inherent in this. 67 Standard Rule
31 expressly prohibits discipline and punishment by placing in a dark
cell, as well as all cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishments. 68 The
United States incorporated the Standard Rules in the Model Penal
Code of 1962.69 Though the Standard Rules are not strictly enforced,
they "have been increasingly recognized as a generally accepted
body of basic minimal requirements."70
Prisoner rights have been increasingly defined in the latter half of
the twentieth century, beginning with the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") in 1966.71 Article 7 of the
ICCPR applies to prisoners and prohibits any use of "cruel, inhuman,
65. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, E.S.C. Res. 2076,
U.N. ESCOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 1, UN Doc. E/5988 (1977) [hereinafter
Standard Minimum Rules], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/
h_comp34.htm.
66. Id. R. 57.
67. Daniel J. Sharfstein, European Courts, American Rights: Extradition and
Prison Conditions, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 719, 749 (2002) (quoting European Prison
Rules, Council Recommendation No. R (87) 3, at 78-79 (1987). See generally
Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 65.
68. Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 65, R. 31.
69. Miller, supra note 2, at 148.
70. Id. (quoting Daniel L. Skoler, World Implementation of the United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
453, 455 (1975)).
71. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, at 52,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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or degrading treatment or punishment."72 Article 10 further provides
that "[a]ll persons deprived of their liberties shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person. '73 In 1984, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("Convention
Against Torture") expanded the protection of prisoners.74 Article 1 of
the Convention Against Torture both prohibits and defines torture for
the international community as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person, information
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person
committed or is suspected of having committed or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person ... when such
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity."
The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992, and the Convention
Against Torture in 1990, with reservations on specific articles.7 6
These reservations present perhaps the greatest obstacle to prisoners'
rights in the United States.77 The reservation on ICCPR Article 7
binds the United States only to the extent that the "cruel, inhuman or
72. Id. art. 7.
73. Id. art. 10(1).
74. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp.
No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/5 1 (1984) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
75. Id. art. 1; see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, ILL EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND
OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 203-14 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.
org/reports/2003/usa 1003.25.htm.
76. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong. (1991) [hereinafter ICCPR
Hearing]; Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 101 st Cong. 22 (1990).
77. See John Henry Stone, The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the United States Reservations: The American Conception of
International Human Rights, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 9-10 (2001)
(positing that these reservations allow the U.S. government to make laws in
contravention of ICCPR standards).
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degrading treatment" means such treatment prohibited by the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.78 Similarly, the U.S. reservation on the Convention
Against Torture's Article 16 makes sure to clarify that the treatment
prohibited is only treatment which is cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment as interpreted via the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.79
IV. EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The numerous international treaties and conventions to which the
United States is a party suggests that protecting individual rights,
especially against cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment and
treatment, is an important goal of the U.S. government."0 The Eighth
Amendment protects individuals in the United States from "cruel and
unusual punishment."'" However, the specific language, as
interpreted by U.S. law, has a narrower scope than international
instruments. The differences in the language between the Eighth
Amendment and that of the U.N. Charter, ICCPR, or Convention
Against Torture is two-fold: (1) the Eighth Amendment protects
against "cruel and unusual punishment," while the international
treaties recognize "cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment;" and
(2) the Eighth Amendment does not mention prohibitions against
treatment as well as punishment, while all of the aforementioned
78. ICCPR Hearing, supra note 76, at 8 (describing other U.S. reservations,
such as those involving free speech, capital punishment, criminal penalties and
juveniles).
79. Miller, supra note 2, at 146. Note too the reservation on Article 30(1)
requiring parties to submit disputes to arbitration and, if no change, to the
International Court of Justice. 136 CONG. REc. S17486-01 (1990) (using the
authority granted by Article 30(2), which permits a State to declare that it is not
bound by Article 30(1)); see also Convention Against Torture, supra note 63, art.
30.
80. See supra notes 44-79 and accompanying text.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
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treaties recognize certain cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment as
well as punishment.8 2
Some have described the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments"
as a "three-word term of art," noting that the adjectives operate
interdependently rather than independently of each other in the
Eighth Amendment realm.83 There has been a great deal of debate in
the U.S. Supreme Court over the meaning of the word "unusual."
Justice Scalia has put forth the notion that a punishment authorized
by the legislative branch of government and "regularly and
customarily employed" must not be "unusual;" this is certainly a
viable interpretive option given the general vagueness and lack of
corresponding international definitions.84 The differentiation between
American interpretations of prisoner rights and those of the
international legal community is perhaps primarily founded in the
fact that the Eighth Amendment does not protect the treatment of
prisoners." Because the Eighth Amendment does not specifically
include treatment with punishment as a constitutional protection, the
standard for determining what is egregious enough to be punishment
and what may be considered merely 'prison conditions' or
unprotected treatment, leaves an obvious gap in protection
standards.86
Initially, only Eighth Amendment claims of physical torture or
abuse arose, but the Supreme Court has steadily created rules which
lower courts and scholars believe indicate that the Court recognizes
82. David Heffeman, Comment, America the Cruel and Unusual? An Analysis
of the Eighth Amendment Under International Law, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 481, 540
(1996) (emphasis added).
83. Id. (quoting John E. Theuman, Annotation, Conditions of Confinement as
Constituting Cruel and Unusual Punishment in Violation of Federal Constitution 's
Eighth Amendment, 115 L. ED. 2D 1151 (1994)).
84. Id.; see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962-65 (1991)
(discussing judicial interpretations of "cruel and unusual" through proportionality
analyses).
85. Heffernan, supra note 82, at 540 (quoting Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary 126-41 (1993)).
86. Id.; see also Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to
the Lost Origins of the Eight Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 661, 684-93 (2004)
(describing judicial interpretations of the word "punishment" in the Eighth
Amendment).
[21:71
2005] SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 87
how the worst kinds of punishment can be psychological.87 Although
Supreme Court jurisprudence initially suggested liberal
interpretations and forward thinking motivations for defining the
kinds of treatment which violated prisoner rights, in the latter half of
the twentieth century the Eighth Amendment standards have become
more subjective.88 This makes a showing of mental abuse or
psychological harm difficult to establish and even if established,
unlikely to rise to a constitutional violation.8 9
As early as 1910, the Supreme Court adopted a prospective
approach to Eighth Amendment interpretation, noting that the
meaning of "cruel and unusual punishments" was expected to evolve
as social conditions did.90 Fifty years later, in Trop v. Dulles, the
Court again reiterated its understanding that the scope of the Eighth
87. See Stone, supra note 77, at 19 (reasoning that the early cases addressing
physical punishment provide implicit recognition of the severe consequences of
psychological harm); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978)
(affirming that conditions of isolation can contribute to an Eighth Amendment
violation); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (determining that non-physical
harm could violate the Eighth Amendment); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146,
1267 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that the severe isolation of mentally ill prisoners
violates the Eighth Amendment).
88. See Boyer, supra note 27, at 322; see also Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d
519, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1967) (finding that deprivation for substantial time of such
basic hygiene elements as soap and toilet paper violated civilized standards of
human decency); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)
(concluding that the use of the strap in Arkansas penitentiaries offended
contemporary concepts of decency and human dignity); Gates v. Collier, 349 F.
Supp. 881, 899-900 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (enjoining prison officials from imposing
corporal punishment of such severity that it would offend present-day concepts of
decency); Simmons v. Russell, 352 F. Supp. 572, 577 (M.D. Pa. 1972)
(maintaining that solitary confinement does not rise to an Eighth Amendment
violation unless confinement becomes so foul and inhuman that it violates basic
decency standards).
89. See Mikel-Meredith Weidman, Comment, The Culture of Judicial
Deference and the Problem of SuperMax Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1505, 1517-
21 (2004) (describing the high thresholds that inmates must meet to succeed in
constitutional claims).
90. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910); see also Boyer, supra
note 27, at 319.
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Amendment is "not static." 91 Further, the Court determined that a
punishment such as denationalization, wherein a person is stripped of
their nationality and status as a citizen, is a non-physical harm that
could be considered violative of the Eighth Amendment, reasoning
that "ever increasing fear and distress" arising from the punishment
was equivalent, if not worse than, torture. 92 This was the first
recognition that mental anguish as a form of punishment was
unacceptable under evolving standards of decency.
A notable change in the Court's attitude and increasing deference
to prison officials occurred in 1976 with Estelle v. Gamble, where
the Court addressed the question of inadequate medical attention
received in prison.93 Moving away from the evolving standards idea,
the Court adopted a new approach which called for both an objective
and subjective inquiry. To show an Eighth Amendment violation,
prisoners must demonstrate that a prison official acted with more
than the ordinary lack of due care.94 A prisoner must establish more
than a purely objective standard of foreseeability of the risk of harm,
such that the subjective intent of the prison official is revealed. 95 This
"deliberate indifference" standard was applied in Hutto v. Finney,
when the Court found that Arkansas' prison practice of solitary
confinement exceeding thirty days violated the Eighth Amendment.96
However, five years later in Rhodes v. Chapman, Justice Powell
posited that prison life should not be comfortable. 97 Justice
Brennan's concurrence in Rhodes affirmed the notion that the
running of prisons is entrusted to the "legislature and prison
91. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Boyer, supra note 27, at
319 (highlighting the court's acknowledgment that the Eight Amendment "draw[s]
its meaning from evolving standards of decency").
92. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102.
93. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
94. Id. at 105; Boyer, supra note 27, at 320.
95. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 ("Medical malpractice does not become a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.").
96. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978).
97. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981) (reasoning that because the
Constitution does not "mandate comfortable prisons," prisoners' level of
discomfort is a matter for legislators and prison officials to decide).
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administration rather than a court." 98 In 1991, Justice Scalia reiterated
the subjective "deliberate indifference" standard of Estelle when
deciding Eighth Amendment claims.99 The Court in Wilson v. Seiter
indicated that plaintiffs in Eighth Amendment cases which cite poor
prison conditions must still show a "deliberate indifference" in the
harm caused by prison officials. 100 Additionally, the totality of
circumstances approach to determining prison standards applied in
Rhodes was by now completely rejected.101
The Court slightly changed its standards for finding an
infringement of prisoners' rights in Helling v. McKinney, where it
found that the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm. 102 By
looking at "objectivity" slightly differently, inhalation of second-
hand smoke from being involuntarily placed with an inmate with
excessive smoking habits was determined to be an infringement of a
prisoner's rights.103 While showing actual likelihood that the injury
will occur, a prisoner must also show that society would find the risk
so grave as to violate contemporary standards of decency.1°4
More recently, the Court in Farmer v. Brennan found that the
"Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual 'conditions';
it outlaws cruel and unusual 'punishments."" 05 For this, the Court
applied the two-prong test and explained what "deliberate
indifference" by prison guards entailed. In essence, a prison guard
may be liable for denying humane conditions "only if he knows that
inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard that risk
98. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 354; Boyer, supra note 27, at 321.
99. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).
100. Id. at 303 (citing Estelle v. Gamble's "deliberate indifference" standard).
101. Boyer, supra note 27, at 322.
102. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
103. Id. at 35-36.
104. Id. at 36 ("Determining whether McKinney's conditions of confinement
violate the Eighth Amendment requires more than a scientific and statistical
inquiry .... It also requires a court to asses whether society considers the risk that
the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of
decency .... ).
105. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
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by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.'10 6 Usually, then,
denial of humane conditions manifests in Eighth Amendment claims
regarding conditions such as prison officials' medical indifference,
failure-to-protect, and excessive use of force rather than an overall
challenge that techniques such as extreme segregation are inherently
inhumane.10 7 The outcome typically has been courts setting basic
standards for physical conditions of incarceration, which are
generally applicable to segregation units as well. 10 8 Practically,
however, such standards only address the requirements of adequate
food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and a reasonably safe
environment without discussing long-term psychological effects. 10 9
Subsequent to Farmer, lower courts began moving toward
specifically acknowledging the serious psychological effects of
supermax segregation techniques, notably in 1995 with Madrid v.
Gomez. 10 The decision found specific- SHU conditions, such as
severe isolation at the Pelican Bay State Prison in California,
violative of mentally ill prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights.1 '
Though Madrid certainly exemplifies a successful Eighth
Amendment case, illuminating the harsh effects of prolonged
segregation, it was a narrow success for specific inmates. The court
concluded that conditions which inflict serious mental pain or injury
implicate the Eighth Amendment, but that not all inmates in the SHU
were sufficiently at risk of developing serious mental health
problems as a result of their confinement.1 2 The court found that it
was unreasonable to subject inmates who showed a "particularly
high risk for suffering very serious or severe injury to their mental
106. Id. at 847.
107. See Rebman, supra note 2, at 595.
108. Id.; see, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978) (maintaining that
the length of incarceration is a factor used to determine whether particular
conditions of confinement fall within constitutionally permissible standards).
109. See Rebman, supra note 2, at 595; see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 526-27 (1984) (explaining that prison officials must take steps to ensure the
safety of the prison staff, administrative personnel, visitors, and prisoners).
110. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
111. Id. at 1279-80 (declaring that "certain conditions in the SHU have a
relationship to legitimate security interests that is tangential at best").
112. Id. at 1265.
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health" to a SHU, but not all SHU prisoners demonstrated such a risk
of injury.113 Thus, while the court posited about the severe
deprivation of normal human contact in the SHU, not all prisoners
were seemingly eligible to avoid such conditions: "those incarcerated
in the SHU for any length of time are severely deprived of normal
human contact regardless of whether they are single or double celled
* . conditions in SHU amount to a 'virtual total deprivation,
including, insofar as possible, deprivation of human contact.'1 1 4
This standard was followed in the 2001 case of Jones 'El v. Berge
where the court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of inmates,
ordering the removal of mentally ill patients from supermax
confinement.1 5 A 2004 Tenth Circuit decision, however, cited
Rhodes v. Chapman when denying relief from supermax segregation
techniques because the plaintiff had not alleged facts of wanton,
unnecessary infliction of pain or punishment grossly disproportionate
to the crime committed.'1 6
V. EUROPE: GLOBAL LEADERS FOR
PRISONERS' RIGHTS
The European Union is becoming known for its progressive
policies on individual human rights, including prisoner rights" 7 as
evidenced by the Intergovernmental Conference in 2003, and the
integration of the European Charter of Human Rights into the draft
constitution of the European Union."8 Indeed, given U.S. prison
policies, such as segregation and minimal protection of prisoner
rights, the global community may soon turn to Europe for future
prison prototypes. Currently, the EU has a complex system of
113. Id. (listing such situations where the prisoner exhibits "overt paranoia,
psychotic breaks with reality or massive exacerbations of existing mental illness").
114. Id. at 1230.
115. Jones'El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1125 (W.D. Wis. 2001).
116. Herrera v. Williams, 99 F. App'x. 188, 190 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
117. Sharfstein, supra note 67, at 748-50; see also Soering v. United Kingdom,
161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) (finding death row isolation inhuman because it
caused intense physical and mental suffering).
118. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1
[hereinafter Fundamental Rights Charter].
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ensuring prisoner rights, based upon the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union ("FREU"), as well as upon the
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention"). 1 9 While the
FREU protects prisoner rights under community law, the premise of
these rights is ultimately derived from the European Convention,
which governs individual member states as well as European state
signatories not a party to the European Union.120
Articles 1 and 4 of the FREU identify the rights of human dignity
and protection from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, respectively.12 1 Praesidium explanatory notes and
reference to the European Convention in FREU Article 52(3) require
those rights and protections to follow the meaning found in the
European Convention and through the European Court of Human
Rights ("Strasbourg Court") jurisprudence. 2 2 Article 3 of the
European Convention is the basis for FREU Article 4, and provides
parallel language to the international treaties discussed above, stating
that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."' 23 Through their interpretations
of Article 3, the Strasbourg Court and European Human Rights
Commission have repudiated the use of torture, inhuman treatment or
119. See Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, art.
2, CONV 850/03, available at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/
cv00850.en03.pdf (declaring the E.U.'s values "of respect for human dignity,
liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights," and that
"[t]hese values are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism,
tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination"); Treaty on European Union,
art. 6, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1.
120. See Giorgio Sacerdoti, The European Charter of Fundamental Rights:
From a Nation-State Europe to a Citizens' Europe, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 37, 48-50
(2002).
121. Fundamental Rights Charter, supra note 118, arts. 1, 4 (declaring that
"human dignity is invoidable" and reiterating the often repeated phrase prohibiting
torture and degrading treatment).
122. See Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, July 28,
2000, Charte 4422/00, Conv. 45.
123. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European
Convention]; accord Universal Declaration, supra note 51, art. 5.
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punishment, and degrading treatment or punishment as three points
along a single continuum of rights violations. 24
The Strasbourg Court has largely been a positive force toward
creating a high standard for prisoner rights as it interprets the
European Convention for all European signatory countries. 25 In the
Soering case of 1989, the court anticipated a violation of the "cruel,
inhuman or degrading" standard and refused extradition to the
United States based upon the extreme psychological effects caused
by death row confinement.126 Recently, the Strasbourg Court has
further outlined specific instances of legitimate segregation
techniques along this continuum, which cumulatively represent
significant strides ahead of U.S. jurisprudence.17
In addition to Strasbourg Court decisions, Europeans have
continued establishing a high level of rights protection on
segregation usage through legislation and incorporation of basic
standards. 28 As early as 1982, the European Commission of Human
Rights condemned solitary confinement in its Krocher v. Switzerland
decision. 29 Since then, solitary confinement techniques have
undergone considerable criticism and scrutiny within the Council of
Europe. 3 ' The European states revised the Standard Minimum Rules
124. Sharfstein, supra note 67, at 748.
125. See generally European Convention, supra note 123, sec. II; Sacerdoti,
supra note 120, at 38 (discussing Britain's acceptance of the binding nature of the
European Convention in October 2000).
126. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 44 (1989).
127. See Iorgov v. Bulgaria, 40 E.H.R.R. 7 (2004); Dankevich v. Ukraine, 38
E.H.R.R. 25 (2003); Kalashnikov v. Russia, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 93; Dougoz v.
Greece, 2001-I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 273; Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44. See
generally Carlos the Jackal Loses Case Over Jail Treatment, REUTERS, Jan. 27,
2005.
128. It should be noted that non-EU European countries are also parties to the
European Convention and thus fall under the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court.
These countries, however, are not party to the new EU Human Rights Charter.
129. Krocher v. Switzerland, App. No. 8463/78, 34 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 24, 53, 62 (1982) ("[C]omplete sensory isolation coupled with total social
isolation, can destroy the personality and constitutes a form of treatment which
cannot be justified by the requirements of security or any other reason.").
130. The Council of Europe differs from the European Union. The Council of
Europe is an independent multi-national body composed of EU and non-EU
European nations.
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for Prisoners, creating a European version that reemphasizes a
commitment to human dignity and minimal use of segregation
techniques."' For example, in the European revision, Prison Rule
38(1) requires that "punishment by disciplinary confinement ...
shall only be imposed if the medical officer after examination
certifies in writing that the prisoner is fit to sustain it" and Rule 38(3)
requires the medical officer to observe prisoners in such confinement
daily, monitoring any change in their psychological state, which
prompts immediate termination or alteration of punishment. 132 The
International Centre for Prison Studies ("ICPS"), in connection with
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, recently codified
the importance of upholding international standards.'33 In 2002, the
ICPS distributed a handbook for prison staff, reiterating solitary
confinement as inappropriate punishment other than in the most
exceptional circumstances and emphasizing that the careful
monitoring of prisoners' mental states was integral to maintaining
the welfare of inmates. 34
Similarly, the Council of Europe's European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture ("ECPT"), in its second general report, stated
how "[s]olitary confinement can, in certain circumstances, amount to
inhuman and degrading treatment; in any event, all forms of solitary
confinement should be as short as possible."'35 In its 1991
assessment of Spanish prisons, the ECPT found that subjecting
someone to very long periods of isolation with little or no activity
131. Recommendation No. R (87) 3 of the Committee of Ministers to Member
States on the European Prison Rules, Rs. 37, 38(1), 38(3) (1987), available at
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal-affairs/Legal-co-operation/Prisonsandaltematives/
Legal- instruments/Rec.R(87)3.asp.
132. Id. R. 38(1), (3).
133. ANDREW COYLE, A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO PRISON MANAGEMENT:
HANDBOOK FOR PRISON STAFF 80 (Int'l Centre for Prison Studies, 2002), available
at http://www.fco.govprisonstudies.co.uk/Files/kfile/fcohandbook l,O.pdf.
134. Id.
135. EUROPEAN COMM. FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, 2ND GENERAL REPORT ON THE CPT's
ACTIVITIES COVERING THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 1991 56
(CPT/Inf (92) 3, 1992), available at http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/annual/rep-02.htm.
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constitutes inhuman treatment.'36  Minimal use of solitary
confinement, especially as it manifests in high security prisons, has
been repeatedly recommended by the ECPT, more recently in its
2000 General Report.137 According to the ECPT, prison security and
management should not ultimately result in any inhuman treatment
or compromise of prisoner dignity.'38
VI. HARMONIZING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Because the U.S. case law surrounding "cruel and unusual
punishment" has created standards deferential to prison
administration, the likelihood of successful prisoner claims in this
area is minimal.'39 Specifically, there seems to be a presumption
against prisoner claims due to both subjective legal standards of
proof and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"),
which created additional procedures for prisoner claims in an attempt
136. EUROPEAN COMM, FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, REPORT TO THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT
ON THE VISIT TO SPAIN 113 (CPT/Inf (96) 9, 1996), available at http://www.cpt.
coe.int/documents/esp/1996-09-inf-eng- 1 .pdf.
137. See EUROPEAN COMM. FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN
OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, 11TH GENERAL REPORT ON THE
CPT's ACTIVITIES (CPT/Inf (2001) 16, 2001), available at http://www.cpt.
coe.int/en/annual/rep- 11 .htm.
In every country there will be a certain number of prisoners considered to
present a particularly high security risk and hence to require special
conditions of detention. The perceived high security risk of such prisoners
may result from the nature of the offences they have committed, the manner
in which they react to the constraints of life in prison, or their
psychological/psychiatric profile. This group of prisoners will (or at least
should, if the classification system is operating satisfactorily) represent a very
small proportion of the overall prison population. However, it is a group that
is of particular concern to the CPT, as the need to take exceptional measures
vis-A-vis such prisoners brings with it a greater risk of inhuman treatment.
Id. 32
138. Id.
139. See Weidman, supra note 89, at 1524 (explaining that the current judicial
standards make it difficult to protect prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights).
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to prevent frivolous litigation. 14 Essentially, the PLRA restricts
federal courts' ability to grant injunctive relief to inmates and
provides a highly deferential standard of review for prison
administration actions.' 41 Prolonged segregation under international
standards, as evidenced above, has been considered cruel, inhuman,
or degrading in circumstances where psychological effects and
extremely long terms of isolation are present. The Supreme Court's
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, however, has defiantly
proclaimed its own standards apart from international rights
obligations. 142
In terms of treaty obligations, the fact that the United States has
still upheld its reservations to both the ICCPR and Convention
Against Torture suggests it continues to protect specific types of
punishment under its own Eighth Amendment standards which
provide fewer rights for prisoners than are available in Europe. 143
This fact presents a dismal view of the possibility of successful
future litigation attempting to mitigate the devastating psychological
effects that are perpetuated by segregation techniques used in the
United States. This is because a litigant must establish a subjective
intent of prison administration before the court can find any "cruel
and unusual punishment" occurring; prisons remain simply
uncomfortable, according to Justice Powell.'44
140. Pub. L. No. 104-134 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000)); see Weidman,
supra note 89, at 1520 (detailing the constraints placed upon the courts by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, which mandates "deference as the default position
for federal courts in prison litigation").
141. § 3626(a)(2) ("Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn,
extend no further than necessary to correct the harm ... and be the least intrusive
means necessary to correct the harm. The court shall give substantial weight to any
adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system
caused by the preliminary relief. . . ."). See generally Weidman, supra note 89, at
1520 (summarizing the Prison Litigation Reform Act).
142. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (affirming that
conditions of isolation in addition to inadequate diet and overcrowding amounted
to Eighth Amendment violations, but that isolation conditions themselves may
not).
143. Sharfstein, supra note 67, at 761-70.
144. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).
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There are, however, potential solutions to the situation of prisoners
exposed to severe segregation and other unsatisfactory treatment in
American prisons. Customary international law may be the best
means of both holding supermax prisons accountable and broadening
the narrow scope of Eighth Amendment protection of prisoner
rights. 4 5 According to Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States: "A state violates international law if, as a
matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones ... (d)
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, or . . . (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights." '146 In determining what is
entailed in "international customary law" or "law of nations," the
federal government and courts are to review a multitude of sources,
such as the writings of foreign jurists, the general usage and practice
of other nations, and judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing
such law. 4 ' Truly this has historically been an American legal
standard: from Justice Jay's proclamation in Chisolm v. Georgia that
"the United States by taking a place among the nations of the earth
[became] amenable to the law of nations" to the signing of the
Constitution when the law of nations manifested into federal
matter. 148
It is also important to consider basic laws on the regulation of
international treaties themselves. The Vienna Convention on Treaties
states that a nation may not enter a reservation that "is incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty.' 49 In terms of the ICCPR,
145. Heffernen, supra note 82, at 542-45.
146. Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own Backyard:
Incorporating International Human Rights Protections Under Domestic Civil
Rights Law-A Case Study of Women in United States Prisons, 13 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 71, 107 (2000) (quoting from Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States § 702 (1987)).
147. Id. at 107-08.
148. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 474 (1793); see Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.
199, 281 (1796) (explaining that in declaring independence, the United States was
bound by the law of nations); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877-78
(2d Cir. 1980) (explaining that upon ratification of the Constitution, the thirteen
former colonies were fused into one nation and bound to observe and construe
international law); Geer, supra note 146, at 108.
149. Law of Treaties, supra note 46, art. 19(c).
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the U.N. has found that states should not enter reservations when the
scope of, or intent behind, such reservations permit the country to
accept a limited number of human rights obligations. 50 The meaning
of these principles for determining U.S. accountability under the
ICCPR and the Convention Against Torture is vague. However, the
ICCPR has been interpreted to protect mental integrity, as well as
protecting against physical confinement.' Considering the
reservation to Article 7 of the ICCPR as a significant divergence
from international standards, the United States only reserves
obligations regarding treatment or punishment, but still remains
accountable on the torture prohibition.'52
CONCLUSION
Solitary confinement and prolonged segregation in U.S. prisons
follow neither international standards for prison management nor
internationally established protections for prisoner rights. Although
the United States has determined that the Eighth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution provides adequate protection against punishments
compromising prisoners' human dignity, it is a lesser standard than
other industrialized nations. The psychological effects of solitary
confinement, particularly in supermax SHUs, is extremely serious
and a violation of international customary law. While solutions exist,
the United States has carefully crafted jurisprudence and treaty
reservations to prevent interpretations of domestic prison practice
under international standards. Numerous organizations, from
Amnesty International to the U.N. Committee Against Torture, have
condemned the use of segregation techniques and the abrasive
conditions in U.S. supermax prisons.153 The United States cannot, as
150. Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States,
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a matter of legal principle nor from an international policy
perspective, pick and choose the human rights it decides to uphold.15 4
If such practices continue, it will not be long before European
countries emerge, if they have not already done so, as the true leaders
in global prisoner rights.
Doc. A/55/44 (2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/
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